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INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, 
FISCAL FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE PHILIPPINES*
Rosario G. Manasan**
I. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
FOR PROVINCIAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
A. Government Structure
The Philippine government is a unitary system comprised of the national or central government 
and the local government units (LGUs). The central government is composed of three independent 
bodies, namely, executive, legislative and judicial branches. The executive consists of 18 departments 
headed by a Cabinet Secretary. The President is chief executive, head of state and commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces. The legislative branch is bicameral with a House of Representatives and a Senate. 
The judiciary has a Supreme Court and several layers of lower courts.
The local government consists of three levels: province/highly urbanized city, municipality/ 
component city,and barangays. At present, there are 75 provinces, 15 highly urbanized cities, 45 
component cities, 1,536 municipalities and 41,300 barangays.
Composed of a cluster of municipalities and/or component cities, the province is both a political 
and corporate entity. It serves as a mechanism for promoting the developmental process in, and the 
effective governance of, the LGUs under its jurisdiction. The provincial governor, its chief executive, 
is elected. The sangguniang panlalawigan or provincial legislature is composed of several elected and 
a number of ex-officio members.
Consisting of more urbanized and developed barangays, the city coordinates and delivers basic, 
regular and direct services and effectively governs the inhabitants within its jurisdiction. A city may be 
classified as either component or highly urbanized. Highly urbanized cities have a population of at least 
200,000 inhabitants and an annual income of at least P50 million. On the other hand, the municipality 
which is composed of a group of less urbanized barangays, performs the same role as the city. Each
* Paper prepared for the Second Workshop on Regional Finance and Economic Development, May 11-12, 1992, Singapore.
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2municipality and city is headed by an elected mayor who acts as chief executive. The legislative body 
of the former is the sangguniang panglunsod while that of the latter is the sangguniang bayan. Each 
legislature has elected and ex-officio members.
The barangay is the basic political unit. It is acluster of households within a territory. The barangay 
serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of the government. It also serves as a forum where 
people express their views and where local disputes may be amicably settled.
B. Factors Affecting Centralization
The system of local governments introduced by the Spanish colonizers has been maintained 
through the various political periods undergone by the country. However, the degree ofcentral 
government control over the LGUs has been changing. Historically, trends in both political and 
administrative decentralization have been influenced by the following: (1) threat to national security; 
(2) personalities of the presidents of the Philippines; (3) national integration; (4) national development; 
and (5) perception of the central government on the competence of local government (Sosmena 1987).
Commonwealth Period (1935-1941). Local governments were placed under the general supervi­
sion of the President as provided for under the 1935 Constitution (Section 10, Article VII). National 
security, political stability and nation building took precedence over local autonomy (Brillantes 1990). 
Moreover, President Manuel L. Quezon is generally perceived to be a centralist who took his supervisory 
power over LGUs to heart.
Third Republic (1946-1972). There was a sharp shift towards greater decentralization.1 The 
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC) through Plan 53-A of 1956 divided the 
country into eight regions for administrative purposes.
Republic Act 2262 (“An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing 
their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments”) was passed in 1959 during President 
Ramon Magsaysay’s term. It provided the city and municipal governments greater fiscal, planning and 
regulatory functions. The Act broadened the taxing powers of cities and municipalities. It also allowed 
them to undertake locally-funded public works projects and adopt zoning and planning ordinances 
(Brillantes 1987).
Republic Act 2370 (“An Act Granting Autonomy to the Barrios of the Philippines”) was also 
enacted in 1959. It gave barrios a quasi-municipal corporate character with legislative and taxingpowers. 
The barrios were to be governed by an elective council. Republic Act 5185 (“Decentralization Act”) was 
legislated in 1967. It increased the financial resources of LGUs and gave local governments greater 
authority over fiscal, personnel and other substantive matters. Provincial and city governments were 
allowed to retain amounts that they were previously mandated to contribute to the central (or national) 
government. Provincial governors were authorized to appoint personnel whose salaries were to be 
locally-sourced. The Act likewise specified certain “duties and powers of local chief executives not 
subject to direction or review by any national official.”
1. The leaders of the Second Republic (1941-1946) were too pre-occupied with survival during the war to be interested in 
decentralization.
3However, in the post war years, “rehabilitation was topmost priority. The Huk rebellion was at 
its height and political factionalism was a negating factor to local autonomy, thereby promoting 
centralism” (Sosmena 1987).
Martial Law (1972-1981). The decentralist wave described above waned. Brillantes (1987) puts 
it even more strongly:
“Decentralization suffered a setback with the concentration of decisionmaking powers in the 
hands of (President Ferdinand) Marcos. Marcos abolished Congress and then went on to suspend 
national and local elections, abrogating unto himself the power to appoint local officials. 
Although elections for a national legislature were later held in 1978, and then for local officials 
in 1980, these were never considered truly reflective of the people’s will because of the prevailing 
conditions of dictatorship” (Brillantes 1987).
Moreover, the 1976 Amendment to the 1973 Constitution gave the incumbent President and concurrent 
Prime Minister all the powers and functions that were vested on him by the 1935 and the 1973 
Constitutions. The amendment was interpreted to include general supervision over LGUs: “Presidential 
supervision is defined primarily in terms of his authority to investigate and discipline local officials. 
Supervision is intended to ensure that local governments comply with national directives and do not 
exceed their authority” (Ocampo and Panganiban 1985).
However, it cannot be denied that the Marcos government articulated and legislated a number of 
ostensibly decentralist initiatives. The 1973 Constitution, for instance, contained a more explicit support 
for political decentralization or devolution. Article XI Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution provided that 
“The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local units especially barrios (barangays) to 
ensure their fullest development as self reliant communities.” Furthermore, it also provided that “each 
local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes subject 
to limitations as may be provided by law.”
Presidential Decree 231 (Local Tax Code) was promulgated in 1973 to specify the taxing powers 
of LGUs and increase the powers of cities and provinces to raise revenues. Presidential Decree 464 (Real 
Property Tax Code) was issued in 1974 to define the appraisal, assessment, levy and collection of the 
real property tax by provinces, cities and municipalities. On the other hand, Presidential Decree 144, 
defining the share of LGUs in national internal revenue taxes, was promulgated in 1973.
At the same time, there were also efforts at administrative decentralization or deconcentration (i.e., 
the delegation of authority from the central office of national government agencies to their regional and/ 
or sub-regional offices) with the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) in 1972. The IRP 
subdivided the country into 11 regions and mandated national agencies to have regional offices (Figure 
1). Furthermore, with the issuance of Letters of Instruction 448 and 895 in 1976 and 1979, respectively, 
certain administrative (pertaining to appointment, transfer, firing, etc. of personnel, preparation of 
budget proposals, disbursement of funds, allocation of funds to sub-regional offices, negotiation of 
contracts for services or supplies not in excess of P200,000, etc.) and substantive (sectoral responsibility 
of the agency) functions were delegated by the central office to their regional offices. Moreover, the 
planning function was deconcentrated through the creation of the Regional Development Councils 
(RDCs). Special regional development authorities were also established to address the specific needs 
of areas perceived to be lagging in terms of overall development.
Figure 1 
MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES
5Fourth Republic (1981-1985). From a decentralization perspective, this period is simply an 
extension of the previous one. The insurgency problem became more pronounced. Moreover, the 
Marcos government, at this time, suffered low public support. Thus, the central government had to 
consolidate its position, sometimes at the expense of decentralization. For instance, local police and fire 
protection services were centralized under the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police. 
Physical planning andregulatory functions were recentralized under the Ministry of Human Settlements 
(Brillantes 1987). Agricultural extension services were integrated under the Department of Agriculture.
Nevertheless, BatasPawbrw.sa (BP) 337 (Local Government Code) was promulgated in 1983. BP 
337 had strong decentralist features. The Code provided that “any power of a barangay, municipality, 
city or province shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence 
of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government units concerned.” In principle, the Code 
also gave LGUs greater discretion over financial matters. To quote:
“As a general rule, local governments shall be allowed as much authority and flexibility over 
the financial aspects of their operations which are consistent with such standards and guidelines 
as may be prescribed by competent authorities.”
However, this was not always followed in spirit. For instance, numerous statutory limitations on the 
nature and level of LGU expenditures and revenue raising powers were observed. Also, the share of 
LGUs in national internal revenue taxes were consistently below the maximum allowed by pertinent 
laws.
Fifth Republic (1986-pressent). The ascent of the Aquino administration into power has been 
marked by increasing decentralization, albeit with some centralist tendencies at its onset. For instance, 
the Freedom Constitution allowed the President control and supervision over all local governments. 
Local officials were replaced by so-called officers-in-charge (OICs). Subsequently, however, elections 
of provincial, city and municipal officials were held in January 1988 and that of barangay officials in 
March 1989.
With the ratification of the new Constitution in 1987, local autonomy gained some headway. First, 
it contains more explicit provisions in support for devolution than either the 1935 or the 1973 
Constitutions. Specifically, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that; (1) the territorial and 
political subdivisions of the state shall enjoy local autonomy; (2) the enactment of a new Local 
Government Code by Congress shall decentralize activities with effective mechanisms for recall, 
initiative and referendum; (3) LGUs shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to 
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to guidelines and limitations of Congress; (4) LGUs shall have a just 
share in national taxes and in the proceeds of the use of national wealth within their respective areas.
In 1988, the Aquino government issued a number of orders/circulars mandating national 
government agencies to delegate some of their functions and responsibilities to their regional offices. 
It also launched the Pilot Decentralization Project (PDP). The purpose of the Project is to develop and 
adopt a framework for managing decentralization from central offices of line departments to their 
regional and provincial offices and to LGUs. Initially four, then an additional 15 provinces, were 
included in the project. The four provinces in the original list received P120 million while the rest 
received P30 million in block grant from the national government. The block grant or Decentralization 
Incentive Fund (DIF) was placed at the discretion of the local government officials. In Tarlac and
6Laguna, the allocation of the DIF was largely the sole responsibility of the governor. In Davao del Norte, 
the Provincial Development Council programmed the use of the grant. In Negros Occidental, the 
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (provincial legislature) played a dominant role in identifying and prioritizing 
projects (Brillantes 1990). The mix of projects funded by the DIF varies from province to province but 
infrastructure projects comprise the bulk of the outlays made.
Under the PDP, the Memorandum of Agreement (MO A) was the vehicle used to devolve authority 
from the national government agencies to the LGUs. Following this approach, specific MOAs were 
supposed to be entered into by the LGUs and the national government agencies (Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of 
Public Works and Highways, Department of Education Culture and Sports, and the Department of 
Health) identifying the functions andresponsibilities delegated by the latter to the former. However, very 
few MOAs were consummated.
In the last quarter of 1991, a new Local Government Code was signed into law to take effect in 
January 1992. It devolves specific powers, functions andresponsibilities from the national government 
agencies to LGUs. It grants LGUs a larger share in national internal revenue taxes. The Code alsogave 
LGU s broader taxing and revenue raising powers. It also restructured the real property tax. The prospects 
for decentralization under this new legislation will be discussed in Section 6.
H. GOVERNM ENT REVENUES: LEGAL FRAM EW ORK
The following discussion will focus on the policy regime that defines the revenue structure of the 
different levels of government from 1976-1991.
A. Tax Assignment
To a large extent, various types of taxes are assigned exclusively to different levels of government. 
However, there are instances where different levels of government are given the power to impose the 
same type of tax.
1. Central Government Taxes
The central government collects most of the revenue-productive type of taxes. The authority to 
impose tariffs on imports, the value added tax (VAT), income tax on individuals and corporations, excise 
taxes on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products, taxes on the gross receipts of transportation 
contractors and common carriers, taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, etc., and the documentary stamp 
tax is vested on the central government alone. In addition, the central government also imposes taxes 
that LGUs may themselves levy like the franchise tax.
2. Local Government Taxes
The bulk of local government taxes comes from the real property tax (RPT) and the local business 
tax (LBT). However, there are other taxes andfees that local governments are authorized to collect. The 
tax base of each of these taxes are defined by national legislation which also sets limits (floors and/or 
ceilings) on the tax rates.
7The RPT is reserved solely for local governments. The basis of the RPT is the assessed value of 
all real properties (lands, buildings and structures, machineries). Assessed value is the product of the 
fair market value (as determined for tax purposes) and the nationally legislated assessment level for each 
class and kind of property. The Real Property Tax Code of 1974 mandated that fair market values be 
revised every three years.2 However, this was never followed. Thus, during the last 15 years, the 
schedule of values was only revised twice, in 1979 and 1987. The scheduled revision in 1983 based on 
1981/1982 prices, was postponed several times by then President Marcos and was only implemented in 
m id-1987.
The provinces and their constituent municipalities were each allowed to levy a basic tax, that may 
range from 1/4 to 1/2 of one percent, on all real properties within their boundaries. Cities and 
municipalities in Metro Manila were allowed to impose a basic RPT at a rate that may vary from 1/2 of 
one percent to two percent.
In addition, PD 464 authorized LGUs to collect an additional one percent tax on real property for 
the Special Education Fund. Proceeds from this tax were shared by the LGUs and the national 
government and earmarked exclusively for education.
Provinces were allowed to impose a tax on the transfer of ownership of real property, franchises, 
the practice of profession or occupation, sand and gravel extraction, admissions to amusement places, 
printing and publication, delivery trucks, vans and peddlers. The transfer tax may notexceed 1/2 of one 
percent of the total amount involved in the transfer of ownership or the assessed value of the real property, 
whichever is higher. Professionals may be subjected to an occupation tax equal of P75 or P50, depending 
on the type of profession or occupation. The printing and publication business as well as franchises 
may be subjected to a tax not exceeding 1/2 of one percent of the gross receipts in the previous year. 
The tax on sand and gravel may not be more than P0.7 5 per cubic meter of material extracted. Amusement 
tax may not surpass 20-30 percent of the gross receipts from admission, depending on the price charged 
per ticket. The tax on delivery trucks may not be greater than P50 or P75 per year per truck, depending 
on the product being transported. Finally, the tax on peddlers may not exceed P2, P5, P10, P15 or P30 
per year, depending on the type of peddler.
Municipalities were permitted to levy a local business tax. The local business tax is essentially a 
graduated fixed tax with different maximum allowable rates for different types of activities like 
manufacturing, wholesaling, exporting, contracting and peddling.
On the other hand, cities may impose all of the taxes levied by provinces and municipalities. In 
general, the maximum allowable rates for cities are 50 percent higher than those for provinces and 
municipalities.
At the same time, the national government imposed a residence tax which was collected by city 
andmunicipal treasurers. Ninety-five percent of the proceeds from this tax was divided equally between 
municipalities/cities and the province. The remaining five percent went to the national government.
2. Prior to the enactment of the Real Property Tax Code, the schedule o f fair market value was revised once every five
years.
8B. Non-tax Revenues
Fees and charges are collected by various government agencies for services rendered. The motor 
vehicle registration fee is reserved for the central government and is one of its most important non tax 
revenue source.
On the other hand, local governments may collect fees and charge for all sorts of services, licenses 
and permits. In particular, provinces may charge a fee for the sealing of weights and measures. 
Municipalities may grant fishery privileges in municipal waters for a fee. All levels of local governments 
may impose regulatory fees on various activities like business operation, practice of certain occupations, 
construction of buildings, sanitary inspection and health certification, civil registration, zoning and 
locational clearance. LGUs may also charge fees for basic services like hospital care, education, roads, 
bridges, ferries, water supply and for facilities like markets, slaughterhouses, parking, etc. In addition, 
note that local governments may also operate local business enterprises.3
C. Central-Local Government Transfers
Presidential Decree 144 (issued in 1973 and amended several times) prescribed that the share of 
local governments in national internal revenue taxes or the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) should 
be equal to a maximum of 20 percent. Moreover, the IRA share of any particular LGU should not increase 
by more than 25 percent in any given year.
Ten percent of the LGU share in national internal revenue taxes was set aside for the Barangay 
Development Fund. Of the remaining 90 percent, 30 percent went to the provinces, 25 percent to the cities 
and 45 percent to the municipalities.
The IRA was distributed to specific non-barangay LGUs based on a formula that gave population 
a 70 percent weight, land area, 20 percent, and equal sharing, 10 percent. The share of barangays was 
distributed on the discretion of national government agencies that manage the Barangay Development 
Fund.
At the same time, local governments were entitled to a 40 percent share in specific taxes on 
lubricating oils, 13.8 percent on naphtha, gasoline and the like, 33.3 percent on bunker fuel oil and similar 
fuel oils, and 4.8 percent on diesel fuel oil. Twenty five percent of the Specific Tax Allotment (STA) 
went to the Barangay Infrastructure Fund. Of the remaining amount, 20 percent went to the provinces, 
50 percent to the cities, and 30 percent to the municipalities. The formula used to distribute the STA 
to specific LGUs was the same one for IRA.
The national government granted LGUs categorical grants for various types of expenditures. 
Examples were funds regularly appropriated for: (1) concreting barangay roads; (2) constructing and 
maintaining local roads; (3) improving rural roads; (4) water supply, sewerage and sanitation project; 
(5) barangay administration fund for the salaries and allowances of barangay officials; and (6) budgetary
3. It is important to remember that the treatment of public enterprise in government financial accounts is asymmetrical with 
regards to "national" public enterprises (oftentimes referred to as government owned and controlled corporations [GOCCs]) and 
local public enterprises. The financial operations of GOCCs do not enter the books of the national government. In arriving at the 
consolidated public sector deficit, only its net financial positions are considered. On the other hand, gross receipts of local public 
enterprises are considered part of the non-tax revenue of LGUs. Their operating expenses are treated analogously.
9aid to LGUs. These funds were administered by various national government agencies like the 
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Department of Public Works and 
Highways (DPWH). The funds were allocatedto various LGUs based on guidelines set by said agencies.
m . REVENUES AND FINANCES: TRENDS AND PATTERNS
General government revenues amounted to P189.9 billion (representing 17.6% of GNP) in 1990 
(Table 1). Of this amount, 95.2 percent was collected by the central government. In terms of revenue 
generation, fiscal decentralization remained at a fairly low level in the last 15 years despite what appears 
to be significant shifts in legislative provision for greater LGU revenue powers. To illustrate, the share 
of LGUs to general government revenues remained in the 4.6-6.8 percent range while LGU revenues 
relative to GNP lingered in the 0.7-1.1 percent range during the period.
A. National Government Revenues
National government revenues reached P180.9 billion or 16.8 percent of GNP in 1990. The share 
of tax and non-tax sources remained fairly stable over time with the latter accounting for 10-15 percent 
of total national government revenues. Both tax and non-tax revenues exhibited the same trend in the 
1980s. The revenues increased slowly from 1980-1985 relative to 1976-1980 and 1985-1990.
The years 1981-1985 represented a bleak period in Philippine public finance. Both tax and non­
tax revenues contracted from 12.6 percent and 1.7 percent of GNP in 1980 to 11 percent and 1.4 percent 
in 1985, respectively. An improvement in tax administration as well as the 1986 Tax Reform Program 
increased the share of tax revenues to 14.1 percent of GNP in 1990. Similarly, tax buoyancy improved 
from 0.9 in 1980-1985 to 1.3 in 1985-1990.4
At the same time, various items in the tax revenues were also restructured. The share of internal 
revenues in the national government taxes increased from 56.9 percent in 1976to 69.7 percent in 1990. 
On the other hand, the share of import tariffs declined from 40.3 percent in 1976 to 30.2 percent in 1990 
(Table 2).
In principle, these developments augur well for local government finance since a substantial 
portion of LGU revenues comes from tax sharing.
B. Local Government Receipts I Income
Relative to GNP, total LGU receipts fluctuated from 1.4 percent in 1976 to 1.8 percent in 1980, 
then down to 1.5 percent in 1985, and up again to 1.8 percent in 1990 (Table 3).
Locally-generated revenues and intergovernmental transfers had an equal share in the total LGU 
income except in 1980 when locally-sourced revenues accounted for 59.5 percent of total LGU receipts
4. Tax elasticity in 1975-1980 was estimated to be one.
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1. Locally-Sourced Income
Relative to both GNP and total LGU income, locally-sourcedLGU revenues exhibited an inverted- 
U trend in the last 15 years. The share of locally-raised revenues in total LGU income was 50.6 percent 
in 1976, peaked at 59.5 percent in 1980, declined to 51.8 percent in 1985 and dipped further to 48.9 
percent in 1990. Similarly, locally-generated revenues stood at 0.7 percent of GNP in 1976, rose to one 
percent in 1980, decreased to 0.8 percent in 1985 and improved slightly to 0.9 percent in 1990. The 
enactment of Local Tax Code in 1973 which broadened the powers of the LGUs to raise more revenues 
might explain the faster growth (relative to GNP) of local revenues in the earlier period. On the other 
hand, the sluggish growth of local revenues in the latter period might be attributed to central government 
restrictions on the local tax structure.
The single major source of indigenously-sourced LGU income was the real property tax (RPT). 
However, its importance weakenedin the 1980s. The RPT contributed 36.6 percent of total LGU locally- 
sourced receipts in 1976,46.2 percent in 1980 and 40.3 percent in 1990. From a peak of 0.5 percent of 
GNP in 1980, RPT revenues declined to 0.3percentin 1985 andrecovered slightly to 0.4percent in 1990. 
The peak performance of RPT revenues in 1980 mightbe explained by the adoption of arevised schedule 
of fair market values in 1979. The deterioration of RPT in 1985 might be attributed to the politically 
motivated delay in the updating of the said schedule. On the other hand, the slight improvement in 1990 
might be due to the adoption (on a phased basis) of a newschedule based on 1981/1982 prices in 1987.
Meanwhile, LBT revenues declined throughout the period 1976-1990 relative to the total locally- 
sourced income and to GNP. Revenues from the LBT declined continuously from 28.3 percent of all 
locally-raised revenues in 1976 to 18.4 percent in 1990 and from 0.2 percent of GNP in 1976 to 0.1 
percent in 1990. The inability of LBT revenues to grow at the same pace as GNP might be explained 
by the unit rates (in contrast to ad valorem rates) prescribed by the Tax Code making the tax extremely 
inelastic.
In contrast, user charges (referred to as operating and service income in the tables) showed an 
upward trend. The contribution of user charges to locally-sourced revenue grew from 16 percentin 1976 
to 28 percent in 1990. The buoyant characteristic of user charges might be due to the fact that while the 
Tax Code prescribed maximum rates for some fees like slaughterhouse charges, there were no 
restrictions on the level of imposition of most other user charges. Moreover, in principle, it is politically 
and administratively easier to increase rates of, and collect user charges relative to taxes because the link 
between the service provided and the exaction is more direct in the former relative to the latter.
2. Intergovernmental Transfers
Total transfers from the national government to LGUs grew from 0.7 percent of GNP in 1976 to
0.9 percent in 1990. The IRA and the STA, the share of LGUs in national internal revenue taxes and 
specific taxes, respectively, comprised the bulk from 61.9-81.5 percent of intergovernmental transfers 
in the last 15 years. The IRA and the STA which are both formula grants, swelled from 0.4 percent of 
GNP in 1976 to 0.7 percent in 1990 due to the buoyancy of the tax base. However, the relatively low 
elasticity of national taxes in 1980-1985 is reflected in the slow growth of the IRA/STA in this period.
In contrast, the trend of categorical grants was characterized by a U-curve. Grants declined from
0.3 percent of GNP in 1976 to 0.1 percent in 1985, and recovered to 0.3 percent in 1990.
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Similarly, the share of categorical grants to aggregate intergovernmental transfers dipped from 38.1 
percent in 1976 to 18.5 percent in 1985 and went up again to 27.8 percent in 1990. The Aquino 
government allocated substantial amounts to grants in 1988-1990. Hence, large increases in grants were 
registered in those years.
The share of provinces in total intergovernmental transfers was fairly stable from 36-39 percent 
in 1976-1985. In 1990, however, it dropped to 28.1 percent. Similarly, cities captured 29-31 percent 
of total transfers in 1976-1985 but only 25.2 percent in 1990. In contrast, the share of municipalities 
surged from 30-35 percent in 1976-1985 to 45.3 percent in 1990. These trends are likewise reflected 
in the movement of both formula and categorical grants.
3. Provinces
Among the different levels of LGUs, the provinces were the most dependent on national 
government transfers. In 1976-1990, for instance, 57-70percent of total provincial receipts came from 
said source because of the small tax base assigned to provinces. At the same time, the administrative 
structure to support the collection of these taxes was weak. The province relied heavily on municipal 
treasurers to collect taxes. Unfortunately, these treasurers received little incentive to do so. Note that 
the municipal share in the provincial taxes was small and at times, non-existent.
In 1976-1985, real property taxes were the second most important source of provincial income, 
contributing 14.9-22.4 percent. User charges contributed 10.5-11.7 percent in the same period. 
However, in 1990, each of these two sources yielded 14 percent of total provincial income.
4. Municipalities
Municipalities depended on national transfers for 55.5 percent of their total receipts in 1990. RPTs 
accounted for 18.6 percent of total municipal revenues while user charges and the local business tax 
contributed 12.8 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. Note that in earlier years, LBT s ranked third, next 
to intergovernmental transfers and RPT. User charges ranked fourth in terms of their share in municipal 
receipts.
5. Cities
As a whole, cities do not depend much on national government transfers as compared to the 
provinces and municipalities. In 1990, the share of national government transfers in total city income 
was only 38.2 percent. Being more economically advanced, the cities have a bigger tax base and can 
generate more revenues than provinces and municipalities. Moreover, both the Local Tax Code and the 
Real Property Tax Code gave cities greater flexibility on the type of taxes they may impose and rates 
they may use.
RPT was the second most dominant revenue source for cities representing 25.2 percent of total city 
receipts. The share of user charges and business taxes were 14.6 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively. 
Like the municipalities, user charges emerged as an important revenue source only in the latter part of 
the 1980s.
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IY. FISCAL EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Assignment Expenditure Responsibilities
The functions assigned to LGUs were fairly limited. In general, they included “planning, levying 
and collecting taxes, budgeting, issuing and enforcing regulations, and administering certain public 
services” (Ocampo and Panganiban 1985). Provinces had some role in agricultural planning and 
extension, construction and maintenance of roads and public buildings, operation of high schools, 
hospitals and health services. In addition to these functions, cities may also operate elementary, 
vocational and other types of schools. Highly urbanized cities were mandated to exercise zoning and 
building regulation, environmental sanitation, and transport and traffic regulation. On the other hand, 
municipalities may operate public markets, slaughterhouses, cemeteries and other facilities. Finally, 
barangays were tasked to settle minor village disputes (barangay justice) and they also took part in 
barangay road construction, and health and social services delivery (e.g., operation of health centers and 
day care centers).
B. Government Expenditure: Trends and Patterns
Aggregate general government expenditures reached P265.4 billion or 24.7 percent of GNP in 
1990 (T able 4). Debt service was the single most important expenditure item accounting for 40.1 percent 
of the total government outlays. Economic and social services obtained roughly equal shares of 18.9 
percent and 19.3 percent, respectively. General public services received 16.5 percent. Public adminis­
tration and education were the top two spenders with 14.1 percent and 12.8 percent of the total 
government budget, respectively. Transportation and communication was a poor third with 8.8 percent 
of the budget.
In the 1980s, debt service accounted for only 7.5 percent of the general government budget. Both 
economic and social services received a bigger slice of the budget at 42.3 percent and 23.6 percent, 
respectively, indicating the government’s development thrust. Note also that the infrastructure/utilities 
received the biggest government allocation at 28.6 percent of the total budget. In contrast, education only 
got 13 percent.
The national government dominated the expenditure program with 93.3 percent of the total outlays 
in 1990. This is higher than its 88.8 percent share in 1980 indicating greater concentration at the center. 
However, if one looks at the budget exclusive of debt service, the degree of fiscal centralization has 
remained constant at 88 percentin the last 10 years. This percentage declined since 1976 when the share 
of LGUs in general government expenditures net of debt service was 92 percent.
The degree of fiscal decentralization appears to be low whether one views it relative to revenues 
or expenditures. However, the share of LGUs in general government expenditures is 2-4 percent higher 
than the share of LGUs in general government revenues. This is because roughly 50 percent of LGU 
expenditures are financed by transfers from the national government.
Superimposed on the formal division of functions across different levels of government were 
statutory requirements preempting the authority of LGUs in allocating their budgets. For instance, LGUs 
were mandated to appropriate 18 percent of their general fund budget (approximately 65% of then- 
consolidated budget) as aid to Integrated National Police, 3-5 percent as aid to hospitals, 20 percent of
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IRA for development projects that were reviewed by the Department of Local Government, reserve for 
election expenses, gratuities of optionally retiring employees, and subsistence of national prisoners. 
Ursal (1989) estimated that approximately 73 pescent of the consolidated budget of a typical LGU had 
been pre-appropriated by law. This implies that LGUs had discretion over a meager 2-3 percent of total 
general government expenditures in the last 15 years.
1. Central Government Expenditures
In 1990, national government expenditure was equal to 23 percent of GNP, representing a marked 
increase over the 1980 level (14.5% of GNP). In terms of distribution to various sectors, the expenditure 
very closely resembled that of the total since it accounted for the bulk of aggregate general government 
expenditure.
2. Local Government Expenditures
Over the years, local government expenditure ranged only from 1.5-1.8 percent of GNP. LGUs 
spent 51.6 percent of its total budget on general public services. The next most important item in their 
budget was economic services which received 32.4 percent of the budget, a big portion (85.6) of which 
went to business enterprises such as markets, slaughterhouses, etc. Social services was a poor third with 
a 16 percent share.
Agrarian reform, national defense and natural resource, trade, industry and tourism management 
and regulation were exclusive functions of the central government. On the other hand, water supply, 
housing, social welfare and health services were more decentralized than other sectors.
Municipalities contributed the lion’s share in total LGU expenditures at 40.1 percent in 1990 while 
cities accounted for 31.9 percent and provinces 28 percent. While municipalities spent 61.2 percent of 
their budgets on general public services, provinces and cities spent 41.7 percent and 48.8 percent, 
respectively. In all levels of government, economic services received approximately 50 percent more 
than social services.
3. Government Investment
Total capital outlay of the government was equal to 5.7 percent of GNP in 1976 and declined to 
3.8 percent of GNP in 1990 (Table 5). Note that since 1983, national government investments suffered 
huge cutbacks as a result of the 1983-1985 economic crisis and in subsequent years because of the severe 
budgetary constraint arising from the government’s debt overhang. In contrast, while LGU investments 
dipped from 0.4 percent of GNP in 1980 to 0.2 percent in 1985, they recovered slightly to 0.3 percent 
in 1990 (Table 5).
LGUs’ share in the total general government capital expenditures grew from 4.1 percent in 1976 
to 7.7 percent in 1990. LGU investments were equally shared by provinces, cities and municipalities.
The low level of LGU investmentexpenditures may be traced, in part, to the controls placed by 
the central government on the mechanics of LGU budget preparation. In particular, the law provides 
thatthe total amount appropriated in the local budget shall not exceed the estimated income certified 
collectible by local treasurers. Coupled with the oral tradition that local treasurers are personally liable
Table 5
GENERAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL OUTLAYS
1976 1980 1985 1980
General government (POOO) 7138818 13612371 27026062 40771234
National 6849639 12658532 25821292 37611435
Local 289179 953839 1204770 3159799
SHARE TO GNP (%)
General government 5r66 5.60 4.86 3.79
National 5.43 5,20 4.64 3.49
Local 0.23 0.39 0.22 0.29
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
General government 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
National 95.95 92.99 95.54 92.25
Local 4,05 7.01 4.46 7.75
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for year-end fund overdrafts, this requirement led to very conservative income estimates, small LGU 
regular budgets with very little room for investment expenditures and the practice of preparing up to 12 
supplemental budgets a year as additional income is realized. Note that the use of numerous and small 
supplemental budgets in any given year implies very little long-term planning and programming of 
investments is actually practised at the LGU level.
At the same time, the regulatory environment was not conducive to LGU debt financing. First, 
LGUs had to comply with numerous and tedious requirements imposed by central government agencies 
like the Department of Finance (which endorses all LGU loan applications to banks) and the Commission 
on Audit (which certifies the LGU ’ s legal and net paying capacity). Second, the Municipal Development 
Fund (MDF) which provides grants and loans to LGUs at subsidized rates discouraged LGUs from 
accessing the private capital markets where the interest is almost thrice as that of the MDF. LGU officials 
reported that they wouldrather queue for MDF funds even if these are limited. Third, while the provinces 
and municipalities were permitted to float bonds, the law was sorestrictive that, in a sense, it has pre­
designed LGU bonds in terms of interest, maturity, and the like regardless of market forces (Saldana 
1992). Thus, to date, only one LGU has been able to issue bonds.
V. ISSUES IN FISCAL FEDERALISM
A. Revenue Adequacy
The ability of LGUs to mobilize public resources through both taxes and other means is a major 
concern in fiscal decentralization.
Can LGUs raise sufficient revenues for their expenditure needs?
The adequacy of LGU revenues may be measured using (1) the ratio of locally-sourced revenues 
to total LGU expenditures and (2) the ratio of the sum of locally-sourced revenues and LGU share in 
national taxes to total LGU expenditures. The first, called self-sufficiency ratio, measures the self- 
sufficiency of LGUs in financing local government expenditures. It depends on fiscal capacity of LGUs 
and their collection efficiency. In tum, fiscal capacity depends on the size of the base assigned to local 
units and the rates that local units may levy. However, this measure fails to capture the share of the 
national government taxes which provide LGUs with ready funds even if the local tax base is limited 
by the prevailing legislative cum administrative policies. The second measure, called revenue adequacy 
ratio, attempts to adjust for the deficiency in the tax base assigned to local units by including shared taxes 
in the numerator.
Table 6 shows the low self-sufficiency ratio of LGUs in the last 15 years. It improved from 49 
percent in 1976 to 57.5 percent in 1980 but deteriorated since then to 51.8 percent in 1990. This poor 
performance may be attributed to several legislative limitations on the taxing power of LGUs. First, mos t 
revenue productive taxes were assigned to the central government. Second, the central government 
restricted the latitude of LGUs in determining the rates at which they may levy local taxes. Moreover, 
the prescription of unit rates rather than ad valorem rates made the LBT very inelastic. Third, the limited 
fiscal capacity of LGUs was further constrained by the centrally mandated postponement of the revision 
of fair market values of real property for tax purposes between 1979 and 1988. Fourth, collection of local 
taxes had been inefficient. The collection efficiency for the RPT was 46.9 percent in 1985 and 57.7
23
24
percent in 1990. While there was no estimate of the efficiency in collecting other types of local taxes, 
it was likely to be lower than that of RPT because the collection of the former was not as well organized 
as the latter. Fifth, local officials failed to maximize the use of their revenue raising powers (N TRC1975 
and 1981).
On the other hand, the revenue adequacy ratio of LGUs was considerably higher than their self- 
sufficiency ratio. The formerregistered improvements from 78.6 percent in 1976to94.4percentin 1985, 
afterwhich it deteriorated to 90.8 percent in 1990. The revenue adequacy ratio would have been 
considerably higher if the full legislative authorization for shared taxes were actually given to LGUs. 
Table 7 shows that between 1986-1990, less than 60 percent of the mandated LGU share in national 
internal revenue taxes was actually released to LGUs. Appropriating less than thelegally-prescribed 
maximum share (20%) and disbursing less than what is appropriated for IRA has been part of long 
standing tradition of undue central government control over LGU finances. Note that if LGUs received 
20 percent of national internal revenue taxes their revenue adequacy ratios for the period would have been 
greater than one.
B. Lessening Regional Disparities
1. Variations in Regional Development
The variation in regional development may be gleaned from Table 8 which shows the per capita 
regional GDP index and the index of the region ’ s share to total GDP. The National Capital Region (NCR) 
has consistently been on top in the last 15 years in terms of per capita regional GDP. Its per capita income 
was 2.7 times of the national average in 1975.
Southern Tagalog and Southern Minadanao ranked second and third, respectively, with per capita 
GDP index of 112 for the former and 100 for the latter in 198 8. Again, these estimates declined relative 
to their 1975 levels. In contrast, the Bicol region’s and Eastern Visayas region’s per capita GDP indices 
were the lowest at 45 and 42, respectively, in 1988.
In recent years, the relative superiority of the NCR dwindled as its per capita regional GDP dipped 
to 2.4 times the national average in 1988. Similarly, the per capita GDP indices for Southern Tagalog 
and Southern Mindanao declined with the drop in the latter more pronounced. On the other hand, the 
biggest gainers in terms of per capita index in the last 15 years were the regions of Ilocos, Central Visayas, 
Western, Northern and Central Mindanao.
2. Compensatory Policies
Decentralization Policies. Will decentralization aggravate regional disparities? This issue arises 
because the distribution of the base of most taxes assigned to local governments is skewed in favor of 
the more economically- advanced LGUs. In the Philippines, the real property tax base in the different 
provinces, in nominal or in per capita terms, is positively related with per capita provincial income. 
Moreover, the correlation coefficients, estimated to be 0.60 and 0.66, respectively, are statistically 
significant at one percent.
Hence, national government transfers are seen as one way of equalizing fiscal capacities among 
LGUs. However, prior to 1992, the formula used for distributing the IRA to specific LGUs did not
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promote fiscal equalization. The internal revenue allotments for LGUs, in nominal and per capita terms, 
are found to be positively related to the per capita income of LGUs. The correlation coefficient between 
nominal IRA and per capita income was 0.54 in 1991 while that of per capita IRA and per capita income 
was 0.01. The former was significant at one percent while the latter was statistically insignificant.
Direct Central Government Expenditure. In the Philippines, direct central government expendi­
tures has been used to correct the lopsided development in the regions. Table 9 shows that the regional 
distribution of central government expenditure remained stable between 1983-1988. The distribution 
may be described as three-tiered with the NCR in the first tier, capturing about 43 percent of total 
expenditures. Central Luzon (Region III) and Southern Tagalog (Region IV) are in the second tier, each 
receiving 10-12 percent of total central government expenditures. The rest of the regions are in the third 
tier, each getting less than five percent. In 1987-1988, some redistribution of government outlays in 
Region III to the other regions (not including NCR and Region IV) can be observed.
The apparent advantage of the NCR and Regions III and IV is less pronounced if one adjusts for 
differences in population size. The pattern of per capita government expenditures across regions is also 
stable over time. The pattern is not as skewed as that of the regions’ share in total government 
expenditures.
While per capita government expenditures in the NCR is highest at more than thrice that of the 
national average, there are now more regions in the second tier. Per capita government expenditures in 
Regions II, HI, IV and XII are about equal to the national average. The rest of the regions receive per 
capita government expenditures that are about half the size of the national average (Table 10).
While estimates of the rank correlation coefficient between per capita income and per capita 
government expenditures (or regions’ share in total government expenditures) were always negative in 
1983-1988 (indicating thatpoorer regions were given abigger share of government expenditures), those 
that pertain to capital expenditures were significantly different from zero in 1987-1988 (Table 11). 
However, its impact on the relative development of the regions is still too early to discern.
VI. PROSPECTS
The revenue and expenditure pattern of central and local governments indicate that the 
perceivedchanging emphasis on decentralization had little impact on ex-post measures of fiscal 
decentralization. Thus, over time, the share of LGUs in revenues generated and expenditures made have 
remained low. Moreover, these measures tend to overestimate fiscal decentralization because the central 
government imposed numerous restrictions on local government budgeting which considerably pre­
empted the allocative functions of LGUs.
The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 ushers in a new policy environment governing local- 
central relations. Under the new Code, many of the functions, responsibilities and authorities previously 
discharged by national government agencies like the Department of Agriculture, Department of Health, 
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 
Department of Public Works and Highways, Department of Tourism, and Department of Education, 
Culture and Sports are devolved to LGUs. Thus, the expenditure responsibilities of LGUs have increased 
considerably.
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Table 9
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT GOVERNM ENT EXPENDITURES
ACROSS REGIONS, 1983-1988
1983 1984 1985
Regions Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 . 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NCR 40.26 62.1 12.11 41.11 57.76 14.6 44.98 59.96 14.53
1 3.99 4.29 3.6 3.83 4.11 3.37 3.95 3.82 4.21
II 6.89 2.78 12.18 3,97 2.67 6.04 3.92 2.66 6.47
III 11.37 4.62 20.08 11.84 4.47 23.56 11.58 4.32 26.32
IV 12.15 6.11 19.94 12.05 5.87 21.88 10.94 5.64 21.73
V 4.32 3.1 5.89 3.15 3.08 3.27 2.88 2.98 2.68
VI 3.76 4.45 2.87 3.68 4.44 2.47 3.29 4.05 1.73
VII 2.83 2.17 3.67 3.9 \ 3.34 4.8 3.42 3.11 4.05
VIII 3.31 2.32 4.58 2.93 2.9 2.98 2.66 2.79 2.39
IX 2.15 1.85 2.53 2.45 2.47 2.41 2.16 2.27 1.88
X 2.75 2.06 3.64 3.78 2.88 5.21 3.08 2.76 3.73
XI 2.65 1.96 3.52 2.77 2.86 2.62 2.59 2.76 2.26
XII 3.58 2.19 5.38 4.56 3.15 6.8 4.57 2.86 8.04
1986 1987 1988
Regions Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NCR 43.57 55.53 14.47 44.01 54.13 . 17.00 43.39 52.55 17.13
1 4.07 4.16 3.83 4.45 4.62 4.00 4.41 4.52 4,09
II 3.98 2.91 6.58 3.73 2.85 6.10 3.85 3.05 6.15
III 11.30 4.93 26.80 9.29 4.97 20.80 8.40 4.05 20.86
IV 10.82 6.30 21.80 11.62 6.61 25.00 11.48 6,88 24.68
V 3.01 3.21 2.54 3.38 3.50 3.05 3.94 4.24 3.06
VI 3.77 4.60 1.76 4.12 4.84 2.19 4.12 4.78 2.23
VII 3.64 3.48 4.04 3.62 3.53 3.85 3.83 3.82 3.85
VIII 2.76 2.95 2.29 3.03 3.12 2.80 3.36 3.56 2.81
IX 2.38 2.56 1.94 2.12 2.43 1.29 2.43 2.83 1.30
X 3.30 3.11 3.75 3.40 3.12 4.15 3.45 3.20 4.18
XI 2.92 3.24 2.16 3.14 3.28 2.76 3.08 3.20 2.73
XII 4.49 3.03 8.05 4.09 3.00 7.00 4.25 3.32 6.92
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Table 10
PER CAPITA DIRECT REAL REGIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, 1983-1988
1983 1984 1985
Regions Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NCR 331.83 511.82 99.82 346.41 486.78 123.08 370.75 494.16 119.79
I 55.64 59.83 50.25 53.53 57.55 47.13 55.00 53.20 58.64
II 138.44 55.96 244.76 77.27 51.99 117.49 82.13 55.86 135.56
III 102.80 41.73 181.52 102.44 38.66 203.90 103.30 38.59 234.90
IV 86.69 43.57 142.27 88.24 43.01 160.19 80.08 41.28 158.99
V 61.46 44.10 83.84 45.17 44.14 46.81 40.64 42.04 37.79
VI 42.80 50.66 32.68 42,08 50.76 28.26 37.07 45.70 19.51
VII 38.67 29.72 50.19 52.73 45.11 64.87 46.36 42.18 54.88
VIII 61.92 43.41 85.78 56.27 55.66 57.23 44.28 46.50 39.76
IX 40.63 34.99 47.89 46.37 46.78 45.71 42.56 45,22 37.16
X 46.67 34.93 61.80 62.87 47.93 86.64 52.94 47.39 64.21
XI 37.41 27.78 49.82 36.73 37.99 34.73 35.90 38.19 31.24
XII 81.68 49.86 122.70 99.61 68.77 148.67 101.40 63.49 178.49
1986 1987 1988
Regions Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NCR 334.63 426.49 111.11 335.22 412.24 129.48 326.08 394.96 128.74
I 59.38 60.78 55.98 65.78 68.25 59.19 65.35 67.02 60.56
II 94.79 69.32 156.80 85.20 65.01 139.13 86.58 68.60 138.11
III 101.37 44.21 240.47 84.15 45.07 188,52 77.90 37.54 193.55
IV 82.01 47.79 165.28 89.35 50.85 192.21 89.58 53.64 192.56
V 42.94 45,73 36.13 48.92 50.71 44.14 56.95 61.38 44.25
VI 43.29 52.78 20.21 46.87 55.09 24.93 46.83 54.32 25.39
VII 49.30 47.10 54.63 49.73 48.52 52.95 52.59 52.48 52.92
VIII 46.63 49.91 38.65 50.57 52.01 46.75 56.29 59.50 47.06
IX 47.86 51.48 39.07 41.74 47.84 25.45 49.65 57.73 26.49
X 57.62 54.36 65.54 59.23 54.32 72.35 60.02 55.58 72.71
XI 41.98 46.46 31.08 44.95 46.99 39.51 43.13 44.84 38.23
XII 104.42 70.43 187.13 93.82 68.84 160.55 98.06 76.55 159.67
National Average = 100
Table 11
SPEARM AN RANK CORRELATION BETW EEN PER CAPITA INCOM E  
AND GOVERNM ENT EXPENDITURES IN REGIONS
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The 1991 LGC requires that barangays provide the following services: (1) agricultural support 
services including the distribution of planting materials and operation of farm produce collection and 
buying stations; (2) health and social welfare services including the maintenance of health and day care 
centers; (3) services and facilities related to general hygiene, sanitation, beautification, and solid waste 
collection; (4) maintenance of barangay justice; (5) maintenance of barangay roads, bridges and water 
supply systems; (6) infrastructure facilities like multi-purpose center, pavements, sports center, etc.; (7) 
information and reading center; (8) satellite or public market, where viable.
On the other hand, municipalities are required to provide the following functions: (1) extension 
and on-site research service facilities related to agriculture and fisheries including dispersal of livestock, 
poultry and fingerlings; maintenance of seed farms and nurseries; maintenance of interbarangay 
irrigation systems, etc.; (2) implementation of community-based forestry projects; (3) promotion of 
primary health, maternal and child care, control of communicable diseases; access to secondary and 
tertiary health services; (4) social welfare services; (5) information services including those on 
investment and job placement, tax and marketing, and maintenance of public library; (6) solid waste 
disposal; (7) municipal buildings, public parks, etc.; (8) infrastructure facilities like municipal roads and 
bridges, school buildings, clinics and other health facilities; communal irrigation, fish ports, artesian 
wells, flood control; (9) public markets and slaughterhouses; (10) public cemetery; and (11) tourism 
facilities.
Meanwhile, provinces are tasked to do the following: 91) agricultural extension and research 
services including prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, animal 
breeding stations; assistance in the organization of farmers’ and fishermen’s cooperatives; (2) industrial 
research and development services; (3) enforcement of forestry laws in community-based forestry 
projects, pollution control law, small scale mining law, mini-hydro electric projects; (4) health services 
including hospitals and other tertiary health services; (5) social welfare services; (6) provincial buildings, 
parks, etc.; (7) infrastructure facilities like provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, 
flood control and irrigation systems; (8) low cost housing; (9) investment support services; (10) inter- 
municipal telecommunication services; (11) tax information system; (12) tourism development.
Finally, cites are authorized to perform all the functions of municipalities and provinces in addition 
to the provision for communication and transportation facilities; support for education, police and fire 
services, etc.
Not only are the functions assigned to LGUs far greater than before, the central government control 
over the local budget in terms of statutory requirements like contributions to hospitals and to Integrated 
National Police, is minimized. Also, the local budget officer who used to be a central government 
employee paid out of local funds is now a local governmentpersonnel. The necessity to get prior approval 
from various government agencies like the Department of Interior and Local Government in the 
implementation of local projects has been abolished.
At the same time, the scope of the revenue powers of local governments is widened. For most local 
taxes, the maximum allowable rate that LGUs may impose are raised. In some cases, the change is 
substantial. Moreover, LGUs are now allowed to tax activities that they were not allowed to cover before 
like banking.
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Also, the share of local governments in national internal revenue taxes is increased from 20 percent 
to 30 percent initially, then eventually to 40 percent. However, if the central government suffers budget 
deficit, then the law mandates that the LGU share should not be less than 30 percent. Moreover, the new 
distribution of the IRA tends to equalize fiscal capacities of LGUs more than the previous law. In 
particular, the correlation coefficient between the nominal level of the IRA and per capita income for 
1992 is estimated to be 0.49 and is statistically significant. While this implies that the transfer is still 
biased in favor of more developed LGUs, it is less so than before. Also, the correlation coefficient 
between per capita IRA and per capita income in 1992 is -0.21 which implies that poorer LGUs receive 
higher per capita IRA under the new scheme. However, it is not statistically significant.
At the same time, the Code liberalizes the regulatory framework for LGU credit finance. LGUs 
may now borrow from the banking system without prior approval from the DOF. Moreover, only the 
Central Bank and the Securities and Exchange Commission may regulate LGU bond issues.
In addition, greater participation of LGU officials in the Regional Development Councils in recent 
years allowed them to gain some experience inplanning and programming of projects. They also gained 
someexperience in project implementation through the management of categorical grants they received 
from the central government. Thus, local capability is gradually strengthened over time although 
additional training is still necessary.
Finally, the macroeconomic policy reform that the government undertook in recent years resulted 
in a more neutral and liberal overall policy environment. This development will tend to reinforce the 
gains from decentralization that will make the devolution process sustainable. For instance, the bias 
against agriculture and exports in the highly protectionist trade regime intensified regional disparities. 
Recent reforms minimizing the biases of the old tariff structure is expected to strengthen regional 
economies. Also, the liberalization of bank branching should work in favor of rural areas and local 
governments.
However, some problems stillremain. Note thatthe Code restructured the real property tax making 
it less revenue productive than before. Also, the ability of local units to raise sufficient revenues to meet 
their growth is constrained by the use of unit rates in levying most local taxes. Unless the LGUs get the 
maximum permissible share in national taxes, LGUs will not be able to have adequate funds to finance 
their new expenditures. This implies that while the opportunity to capture efficiency and redistributional 
gains from decentralization is engendered by devolution program, said benefits will not be realized 
unless additional measures are adopted to make LGUs more financially independent.5
5. The efficiency and redistributional gains from devolution are expected as LGUs are given greater discretion in deciding the 
level and mix of public services they provide. This proposition is based on the premise that local units, by virtue of their "nearness" 
to the people, are in a better position to supply the appropriate quantity and quality of specific services their constituents demand and 
are also better able to target certain sector as beneficiaries of specific programs.
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